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ABSTRACT: 
 
Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in 
believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one 
believes it.  I defend a much stronger thesis.  It is impossible to believe without 
knowledge of one’s belief.  I argue, roughly, as follows.  Believing that p entails 
that one is able to honestly assert that p.  But anyone who is able to honestly 
assert that p is also able to just say—i.e., authoritatively, yet not on the basis of 
evidence—that she believes that p.  And anyone who is able to just say that she 
believes that p is able to act in light of the fact that she holds that belief.  This 
ability to act, in turn, constitutes knowledge of the psychological fact.  However, 
without a broader theory of belief to help us make sense of this result, this 
conclusion will be hard to accept.  Why should being in a particular mental state 
by itself necessitate an awareness of being in that state?  I sketch a theory that 
helps to answer this question: believing is a matter of viewing a proposition as 
what one ought to believe.  I show how this theory explains (and entails) the 
thesis that to believe is to know that you believe. 
 
 
Many would agree with the following:  Believing a proposition normally or 
ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the 
question of whether one believes it.  Stronger claims in the vicinity—e.g., that 
believing necessarily results in believing that one believes, that such second-order 
beliefs amount to knowledge—garner significantly less sympathy.  But I will argue 
for the boldest variation.  It is part of the metaphysical profile of belief that the 
subject has knowledge of her belief.  One can no more believe without knowing 
one believes than an object can be red without being colored: it’s metaphysically 
impossible.  And I’ll give the outlines of an account of belief that explains why.  
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I proceed in two stages.  In section one, I defend an argument that 
believing is essentially tied to a distinctive kind of knowledge that one believes.  
Roughly:  Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p.  But 
anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say—i.e., 
authoritatively, yet not on the basis of evidence—that she believes that p.  And 
anyone who is able to just say that she believes that p is able to act in light of the 
fact that she holds that belief.  This ability to act, in turn, constitutes knowledge 
of the psychological fact.  To believe is to know, not on the basis of observation or 
evidence, that you believe.   
The argument of the first section, if successful, shows that any theory of 
belief that fails to recognize its essential self-consciousness is to that extent 
defective.  The argument does not rely on any specific theory of belief.  But 
without a theory of belief, the argument is not credible.  For it is quite puzzling 
why simply being in a particular mental state should by itself necessitate an 
awareness of being in that state.  In the second section, I sketch a theory that 
helps to resolve this puzzle.  Putting caveats and clarifications aside for the 
moment, I argue that belief is a matter of viewing a proposition as meeting a 
certain standard of correctness, as being such that one ought to believe it.  The 
ability to say authoritatively, yet not on the basis of observation or evidence, that 
one does believe p requires nothing beyond the ability to express one’s view that 
p is what one ought to believe.  Since there is no puzzle about the latter ability, 
there should be no puzzle about the former.     
 The two sections are mutually supporting.  The first section argues, in a 
theory-neutral way, for a thesis that is hard to accept without an explanation of 
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how it could possibly be true.  The second section provides a theory that explains 
(and entails) the thesis, thereby supporting the first.  I advance several 
independent reasons for adopting the theory of belief sketched in the second 
section, but one such reason is that it can accommodate the truth about belief 
established by the argument in the first.  The first section in that sense supports 
the second.     
  
I. Doxastic Self-Knowledge 
 
Belief, I argue, is a sort of attitude toward a proposition that includes an 
awareness of holding that attitude.  I defend the thesis by arguing for the 
following principles: 
 
(A) S believes that p only if S is able to honestly assert that p,  
(B) S is able to honestly assert that p only if S is able to avow the belief that p 
(C) S is able to avow the belief that p only if S knows that she believes that p. 
 
My argument for these principles establishes that it is impossible that one could 
believe that p yet not know that one believes that p. Believing that p is 
metaphysically sufficient for knowing that one believes that p.  In this section, I 
will not argue for this conclusion on the basis of a theory of belief.  Rather, I’ll 
argue that (A) (B), and (C) are, properly understood, compelling and that there 
are plausible responses to the obvious objections and counterexamples.  
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Before considering (A), I’ll begin with a methodological preamble.  Here is 
a common strategy for adjudicating philosophical disputes: first, identify the data 
that need to be explained; and second, consider how well the views on offer 
explain them.  One might expect a defense of my thesis to proceed along these 
lines.  This would be to argue that a theory of belief according to which we are 
necessarily aware of our beliefs better explains the data than other theories.   
But this strategy runs into trouble if the data themselves are under 
dispute—as they often are, and as they will be here.  One controversial 
implication of the view I aim to defend is that non-rational animals and very 
young children do not have beliefs—or, more precisely, that the states that we 
ascribe to them using terms such as ‘believes’ and ‘thinks’ are not the same as 
those we ascribe to adult humans using those same terms.  While such a view is 
not unprecedented (see e.g., Davidson 1982 and Stich 1978), many take it to be a 
constraint on a theory of belief that it allow that young children, human adults 
and non-human animals all ‘believe’ in the same sense.  Unsurprisingly, I will not 
take this ‘fact’ to be among the data to be explained.  (But I will outline, in section 
II, a strategy for understanding how—if not in terms of states shared with adult 
humans—we should understand the minds of non-rational animals and very 
young children.)  
My topic is the rational state that we attribute to normal adult humans 
using ‘believe’ and its cognates.  (And I shall use these terms exclusively to refer 
to the rational state in what follows, except where otherwise indicated.)  This 
essay puts the following proposition to the test:  It is profitable to consider beliefs 
so understood as constituting a sui generis category, characterized (on the basis 
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of the argument of section I) in part by the inseparability of believing and 
knowing that one believes.  This possibility (and what it would reveal about the 
nature of belief, were it actual) is invisible if one assumes at the outset that there 
are non-rational believers, i.e., if one assumes that the state we attribute to 
rational creatures using the language of belief is also possessed by non-rational 
creatures.  For in that case, knowledge of belief will ‘turn out’ to be only 
contingently related to belief.  
It is no better to leave the issue of whether there are non-rational believers 
as an open question as we measure rival theories according to how well each 
explains the data my opponents and I do agree about.  For an approach that does 
not specifically attempt to explain (what I argue are) the distinctive epistemic 
features of belief (understood as a rational state) will not yield an account that 
illuminates such features.  And we shall see in section two that what explains 
these epistemic features is precisely what explains belief’s being rational.  
Bracketing the question of whether adult humans and non-human animals 
‘believe’ in the same sense might seem to be a judicious compromise between 
assuming that they do and assuming that they don’t.  But this methodology 
simply removes from consideration the idea that the nature of our beliefs is 
essentially bound up with our being rational; it is precisely this idea that I aim to 
explore here.  
It will help to offer a preliminary characterization of what I mean in 
describing belief as a rational state.  Belief is an attitude about which one might 
intelligibly inquire: “Why do you believe it?”  This question asks the believer to 
provide reasons of a particular sort—not those which show what is to be gained 
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for holding a belief but reasons for thinking the relevant proposition is true.  The 
believer may not have a reason or may have a bad reason.  But the question 
asking for her reasons must have application (to use Anscombe’s phrase).  Belief, 
adequately supported by reasons (and sometimes even without any such 
support), constitutes knowledge.  But whereas some beliefs may not constitute 
knowledge, beliefs are as such eligible to do so.    
To understand belief as that to which the specifically doxastic sort of 
‘why?’ question has application is thus compatible with specific instances of 
rational states being irrational.  Belief is a rational state, notwithstanding that 
beliefs are sometimes irrational.  One must not conflate the distinction between 
the rational and the irrational (a distinction at the level of specific cases) with the 
distinction between the rational and the non-rational (a distinction at the level of 
general kinds).   
My justification for excluding the states of non-rational creatures also 
supports the exclusion of various non-rational states of rational creatures, states 
that might, along with belief proper, also dispose one “to act and react – not just 
outwardly but also in one’s phenomenology and patterns of cognition – shall we 
say, belief-that-P-ishly” (Schwitzgebel 2011, 45).  My thesis does not concern the 
“associative, automatic, and arational” states that Gendler calls ‘aliefs,’ since the 
question asking for a reason does not apply to these (Gendler 2008).  A visceral 
fear, say, may dispose me to behave as if I believe that failing to step back from a 
floor-to-ceiling window will lead to my falling out of the building.  But I may 
nonetheless not believe the corresponding proposition—not even a little bit.  For 
what underlies my behavior is not the sort of state about which a question 
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concerning my reasons for being in it gets a grip.  There is no question here of 
my evidence for thinking I’ll fall.  Even if I actually will fall, this state is still not a 
candidate for my knowing that I’ll fall.  Belief, in the ideal case, constitutes 
knowledge.  But visceral fears are not even defective exercises of our epistemic 
powers.  
Similarly, implicit biases do not fall within the scope of my thesis.  For an 
implicit bias is not eligible to be held on grounds.1  And so even where implicit 
biases are accurate, they nonetheless do not count as knowledge.  They are non-
rational states, and hence not beliefs in the relevant sense.  Note that my claim is 
not that implicit biases (or visceral fears, for that matter) are insensitive to 
evidence.  A non-rational tendency might be causally sensitive to evidence; but 
its being non-rational means that the subject does not have an evidential basis 
for being in the state; for it is, qua non-rational, not that sort of state.2 
                                                
1 I would thus distinguish between implicit bias and tacit belief.  A belief that my 
sandwich is edible is tacit in the sense that it is not ‘running through my mind’.  
But it nonetheless can be held for reasons—I believe it, say, because it’s made of 
bread, salami and butter, all of which are edible.  This distinguishes it from an 
implicit bias.  It is no coincidence that tacit beliefs are rational in this sense, and 
that they are generally taken (notwithstanding their being tacit) to fall within the 
scope of first person-authority.  One goal of this paper is to reveal the connection 
between these two facts.  
2 Cf. Schwitzgebel 2010, 539-541.  Although the distinction between a state’s 
being caused by p and a state’s being held on the basis of p is uncontroversial, 
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I argue (in section I) that belief is essentially known to the believer; and I 
give an account of belief (in section II) that explains this fact—as well as many 
other salient facts about belief.  The illumination provided by this account will, I 
hope, vindicate my methodology: specifically, my refusal to include among the 
data to be explained the ‘fact’ that adult humans, very young children and non-
human animals all believe in the same sense.  
 
(A) S believes that p only if S is able to honestly assert that p 
 
According to (A), it is a necessary condition of believing that p that one is 
able to honestly assert it.  I employ ‘able’ (as it figures in (A) – (C)) to refer to a 
two-way power.  To say that S is able to honestly assert that p is to say that S has 
the power both to honestly assert it and not to honestly assert it (see Kenny 1976, 
ch. 7 and, more recently, Alvarez 2013).  It is not to say merely that S is disposed 
to honestly assert it, in the way that fragile objects are disposed to break, nor (if 
this is something different) that there is some specifiable circumstances under 
which, necessarily, S will honestly assert that p.   
There are nonetheless some respects in which abilities are similar to 
dispositions.  The possession of an ability is consistent with the absence of an 
opportunity to manifest it, just as the possession of a disposition is consistent 
with the non-obtaining of its manifestation-conditions.  Hector is able to ace the 
                                                                                                                                            
there is much dispute about how precisely it should be understood.  I weigh in on 
this issue in Marcus 2012. 
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logic exam, even while the exam remains locked up in the professor’s desk.  The 
circumstances must be favorable for the exercise of an ability.  Favorable 
circumstances will sometimes include having the help of others.  A brain surgeon 
might have the ability to remove a tumor, but in order to actually do it he would 
require a lot of help from residents and nurses (not to mention specialized 
equipment).  
  Abilities, like dispositions, can also be masked.  Hector is able to ace the 
logic exam, but can’t exercise this ability until the bees stop swarming around 
him.  There is no bar to masking being internal: Hector is able to ace the logic 
exam, but can’t exercise this ability with that horrible headache.  Internal masks 
can be psychological (e.g., lack of confidence) or non-psychological (e.g., 
paralysis).  It is perfectly consistent to say, then, that S has the ability to x, but 
can only exercise it if certain obstacles can be overcome.   
Like a disposition, an ability to x provides a minimal explanation of a 
subject’s x-ing, in at least this sense: there can be no question of how it is possible 
that a subject who is able to x is x-ing. 3  Or, more carefully: given that S has the 
ability to x, the only remaining questions about how it is possible that S is x-ing 
pertain to opportunities and masks.  Consider the following questions about 
dispositions: “I know it is fragile, but how can it break?” and “I know it is 
poisonous, but how can it sicken?”  In each case, the question only makes sense 
insofar as we take the questioner to know or suspect or wonder about the absence 
                                                
3 I discuss this and other features of abilities and dispositions in my Marcus 2012, 
ch. 1. 
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of an opportunity (the cup sits on a shelf, the poison is in the vial) or the presence 
of a mask (the cup is protected by packing material, everyone has drunk the 
antidote).  If the opportunity-or-mask interpretation of the question is ruled out, 
we would have grounds for doubting whether the questioner truly possesses the 
relevant disposition-concept.   
This suggests a test for whether a property p is sufficient for a disposition 
or ability to x.  If p is such that “I know S possesses p, but how can S x?” is only 
reasonably interpretable as a question about opportunities or masks, then p is 
sufficient for the possession of the disposition or ability to x.  By this test, being 
heavy is sufficient for the disposition to fall (“I know it is heavy, but how can it 
fall?”) and being a chess grand-master is sufficient for the ability to beat my five-
year old (“I know she’s a chess grand-master, but how can she beat my five-year 
old?”).  I shall use this test in arguing for (A).  I contend that the question “I know 
that S believes that p, but how can S honestly assert that p?” is only reasonably 
interpretable as a question about opportunities or masks.  Later, I will use this 
test to argue for (B) as well. 
 No one could dispute that it is at least normal for someone who holds a 
belief to be able to honestly assert it.  Once we have put aside cases of non-
rational states, such as visceral fears, which (as explained above) are not in the 
purview of my thesis, the question of whether we can conceive believing that p 
without such an ability would seem to depend on how best to describe certain 
abnormal cases.  Consider Alfred and William, brothers who have both set out for 
a career as painters, but with very different results.  Alfred has been a great 
success from the beginning: a full scholarship to the Rhode Island School of 
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Design, designated at 23 as one of 10 young artists to watch by Marina 
Abramović, multiple pieces in the Whitney Biennial by 27, and by 30 considered 
a leader of a movement of younger artists.  But by 34, he has effected a Pynchon-
esque disappearance from public view.  It is only after Alfred’s whereabouts have 
become the topic of frenzied speculation, after spotting him has become 
something of a sport, that William begins to receive any encouragement for his 
own work.  He finds himself invited to various art-world events from which he 
had formerly been excluded.  He is accepted to a prestigious artists’ residency. 
Important galleries seem more interested in his work, not to the extent of actually 
offering to represent him, but at least willing to see his work and give advice.  
William, we can suppose, believes that this newfound interest is not really in his 
own work, but rather in his connection to Alfred.  Indeed, we might even say he 
knows that it is the desire to reach his brother that lies behind these recent 
overtures.   Nonetheless, he cannot overcome the temptation to take pleasure in 
them as if they reflected genuine appreciation for his heretofore neglected 
paintings.  He begins to tout these developments to friends as evidence that the 
success for which he has so long pined is now finally within reach.  He flies into a 
rage at the slightest hint of skepticism among these “so-called friends”.  The 
complex brilliance of his work, he vehemently argues, explains both its initial 
obscurity and its incipient renown.  He is self-deceived. 
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My thesis raises the odd question of whether William nonetheless has the 
ability to honestly4 assert that the recent attention he has been receiving is simply 
the product of interest in his brother’s whereabouts.  The issue is not merely the 
question of whether he is able to grasp and utter the sentence “people are only 
interested in me for the sake of getting in touch with my brother”, but whether he 
is able to ingenuously use the sentence to say what he thinks.  William’s case 
makes it tempting to think that the ability to honestly assert a proposition 
involves both the expressed belief and something else—a higher-order belief, for 
example.  To explain how someone who believes that p is able to honestly assert 
it, one needs to appeal not just to the belief, but also to the person’s believing she 
holds it.   
However, this gets the explanatory facts entirely wrong.  That someone 
who believes that p is able to honestly assert it needs no explanation.  If you tell 
me that you know that Alma believes that p, but wonder how she can say so, your 
very puzzling question could only be reasonably interpreted as asking about 
whether some obstacle stands in the way of communication.  And so I would 
                                                
4 I talk about honest rather than sincere assertion, since some hold that sincerity 
depends not on whether the speaker believes the asserted proposition, but rather 
only on whether she takes herself to believe it.  See Moran 2005.  The same 
stance would not be plausible regarding honest assertion.  One cannot honestly 
assert that p unless one believes that p.  Thus I would argue that someone who 
doesn’t believe that p can’t honestly say that p, even if Moran is right that she 
might sincerely say that p.   
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naturally follow-up with a question like: “What would stop her?”.  In other words, 
I would have to understand your question as pertaining to opportunities or 
masks.   I could not reasonably interpret it as pertaining to a missing ability.  
William deliberates about the genuineness of the newfound interest in his 
art—“after all, the greatness of truly original works, as Proust observed, is rarely 
recognized immediately”—in bad faith, or at least with pathological 
disengagement.  He puts forward the outcome of this disengaged deliberation as 
his actual opinion, but does not assert what he truly believes. 5  We can 
sympathize with the obstacle that prevents him from doing so: the dread 
associated with having to surrender his newfound feelings of self-worth and to 
return, with renewed despair, to full consciousness of his underlying misery.  But 
regarding the tricky and seldom-asked question of whether this psychological 
obstacle destroys or merely masks the relevant ability, the general test for 
dispositions and abilities formulated above reveals it to be the latter.  William 
cannot, so long as he is self-deceived, honestly make the relevant assertion—not 
because he lacks the ability, but because the ability is masked.  
No doubt one could conjure up a philosophical theory of belief that would 
say otherwise.  But note, first, that we have just seen that such a theory is not 
                                                
5 Some resist thinking of the self-deceived as truly believing (let alone knowing) 
the unpleasant truth.  See, e.g., Mele 1987 and 2001.  I note here that if this were 
correct, then self-deception would not pose a challenge to my view, since there 
would then be no question of whether the subject could honestly assert the 
(believed) unpleasant truth.   
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required in order to accommodate the idea that the self-deceived cannot (while 
they remain self-deceived) honestly assert what they truly think.  Second, the 
plausibility of the test and what it highlights suggests that it would be a 
revisionary theory—i.e., one that requires us to revise our concept of belief.  
Third, there are, as I will show in section II, independent grounds for preferring a 
theory that accords with the ordinary conception of belief, according to which 
believing is inseparable from the ability to honestly assert.  
So far I have considered the problem of self-deception as a threat to (A).  
But the problem re-emerges in slightly different forms in relation to (B) and (C) 
as well, so we are far from done with the issue.  
There are also reasons for doubting (A) that have nothing to do with self-
deception.  It might be argued that believing that p can’t by itself explain how 
someone is able to honestly assert that p, for such an explanation must add that 
the subject possesses a language with which to assert.  However this is not 
plausibly separate from what’s required for belief itself.  Note, first, that belief, 
unlike perception, is considered a paradigmatic conceptual mental state.  The 
issue of whether perception is conceptual or non-conceptual has always been 
framed in terms of whether it is like belief in requiring the perceiver to possess 
the concepts corresponding to the content of perception.  So belief, according to 
most everyone, requires concepts.  Perhaps it will be argued that some creatures 
might possess concepts in the sense required for belief without mastering a 
public language with which to articulate those concepts.  But now keep in mind, 
second, that belief is a rational state, in the sense that the believer is in a position 
to ‘give application’ to the question asking for her reasons: either by giving them 
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or by saying she has none.  Either way, part of being a believer is understanding 
the request for a reason, and this cannot be done by a non-linguistic creature.  
This is not to deny, as I shall emphasize below, that non-rational animals have 
thoughts about the world.  It’s just to deny that these thoughts take the same 
form as ours do. 
A final worry about (A):  Some argue for the view that to believe is to 
possess a cluster of cognitive, phenomenal, and behavioral dispositions (see 
Schwitzgebel 2010).  If all of the others are present, it might be asked, does it 
really matter so much if the ability to honestly assert is missing?  Could this really 
make the difference between belief and non-belief?  Yes.  Given that belief-that-
P-ish behavior has sources beyond belief (e.g., visceral fears), such behavior 
taken by itself does not constitute evidence in favor of the presence of belief as 
opposed to one of those other sources.  Furthermore, without the connection to 
what the subject is able to assert, we have decisive evidence that the relevant 
behavior is the result of something other than the rational state to which my 
inquiry is (for the reasons given earlier) confined.  
It is worth emphasizing that my point here is not that believing is identical 
to the ability to honestly assert.  (A) is not offered as a theory of belief, but rather 
as a truth about belief for which a theory must ultimately account.6   
                                                
6 Another objection to (A) comes from an advocate of a knowledge-norm for 
assertion: one should assert only what one knows.  One might argue on the basis 
of such a principle that if, e.g., one knows that one doesn’t know that the butler 
did it, then one cannot honestly assert that he did—even if one believes that he 
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(B) S is able to honestly assert that p only if S is able to avow the belief that p  
 
To assert is to perform a certain act.  It is intentionally to put forward the 
asserted proposition as true (cf. Heck 2006), which is to say that the person who 
asserts understands that an act of assertion can be criticized if the asserter 
doesn’t in fact believe that p, understands that, in asserting that p, she represents 
herself as believing that p (cf. Black 1952 and Davidson 2001b, essay 18),7 as 
opening herself up to follow-up questions like “why do you believe that p?” (cf., 
Boyle 2011).  Understanding these things is part of what it is to assert 
intentionally because in the absence of such knowledge, one would not know 
what one was doing in asserting, one would not be acting under the description 
‘asserting’.8   
An assertion is revealed to be less-than-fully honest by a reply such as: 
“I’m not at all sure that I do believe that p.”  If one has any grounds for doubt 
                                                                                                                                            
did it.  But even if we accept the knowledge-norm, it does not follow that 
someone who asserts without knowledge is being dishonest.  At worst, they are 
being deliberately misleading.  But not every form of deceptiveness is dishonesty. 
7 That an asserter of p represents herself as believing that p is also implied by the 
view that such an asserter represents herself as knowing that p. See Unger 1975, 
ch. 6, Slote 1979 and DeRose 2002. 
8 See Anscombe 2000 and Davidson 2001a essay 3 for discussion of the essential 
tie between doing X and acting under the description ‘X’.   
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about whether one believes that p, the assertion is at least somewhat 
disingenuous.  It’s not intelligible that someone might honestly assert that the 
subway is safe, but yet be in a position to be apprised of the fact that she believes 
that the subway is safe by an appeal to behavioral evidence.  Were someone to 
utter the words “the subway is safe” and her audience were to respond by saying 
“so you actually believe the subway is safe?”, and she were to reply “oh, do I?  I 
hadn’t realized,” we could no longer consider her initial utterance an assertion at 
all.  It’s not as if we would simply continue with something like “yes, you just 
asserted that p and assertion that p is an expression of belief, so, assuming you 
were honest, you must believe that p.”  Thus it would be bizarre to attempt to 
inform an asserter that she believes the asserted proposition.9  
Furthermore, it’s not just that an asserter of p cannot learn that she 
believes that p from someone who witnessed the assertion.  Rather, we cannot 
intelligibly view her as honestly asserting that p while only crediting her with an 
evidence-based awareness of the fact that she believes that p.  If the supposed 
                                                
9 An anonymous referee suggests a counterexample to my claim that honest 
assertion expresses belief.  Someone in the audience at a horror movie might say 
“he’s coming to get you!” despite not truly believing anyone was in fact in danger.  
How precisely we should understand the way in which we are drawn into the 
world of a fiction while at the same time recognizing that world’s non-actuality is 
a fascinating issue.  A full discussion is not possible here.  But I would argue that 
such statements are assertions only in the same qualified sense as what they 
express are beliefs.  
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asserter were to reply to “so you actually believe the subway is safe?” with “yes, I 
noticed that I believed it right away” or “yes, it’s impossible to miss that fact 
about myself” we would, again, lose our footing with her original remark.  The 
attitude towards p expressed by the assertion is inextricably bound up with the 
speaker’s not having to notice and so not being in a position to miss or not miss 
the fact that she holds the attitude.  The distinctive authority that characterizes 
avowals of belief is already present in assertion.  To accept that the speaker has 
made an honest assertion is to treat her as being in a position to avow the belief, 
i.e., to state authoritatively, yet not on the basis of observation or evidence, that 
she believes the relevant proposition.  And so if it is understood that a speaker is 
able to honestly assert that p, a question regarding whether she can avow the 
belief that p is only reasonably interpretable as question about whether there will 
be an opportunity to do so or whether the ability is masked.  By our test, then, the 
honest-asserting-ability is sufficient for the avowing-ability.   
Putting this result together with that of the previous section:  Believing 
consists in part in the ability to avow a belief, i.e., to say authoritatively, yet not 
on the basis of observation or evidence, that one holds the belief.  Beliefs are 
expressible, not just via assertions, but also via avowals of belief. 
It might be objected that although the assertion-capable creatures with 
which we are familiar are able to avow their beliefs, it may yet be merely a 
contingent truth that asserters are avowers. To defend (B), we would need an 
argument that necessarily, asserters are avowers.   
What rules out an asserting non-avower is implicit in the discussion 
above: without an ability to ascribe beliefs to itself (authoritatively, but not on the 
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basis of observation or evidence) it could not know what it was doing when it 
‘asserted’ that p, i.e., it could not be asserting intentionally.  If one were to 
respond to the ‘assertion’ of a supposed asserting non-avower by asking “so, you 
really believe that p?”, it would not understand.  This lack of comprehension is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that it had been intentionally asserting.  
Furthermore, the notion of creatures capable of assertion, but incapable of ever 
intentionally asserting, is nonsensical.  Indeed, it is not clear that asserting is 
something that someone can ever do unintentionally (although one might 
unintentionally assert that p, as opposed to q).10   
It follows from this argument that asserters must possess the concept of 
belief.  Given (A), this means that belief requires the concept of belief.  This can 
seem strange.  After all, other mental states do not require for their possession 
the concepts of those very mental states: pain, for example, does not require the 
concept of pain.  Even if belief and assertion require the mastery of a public 
language, why must this language contain the concept of belief in particular? 
                                                
10 It might be objected that we do occassionally make assertions unintentionally.  
A man might blurt out “you lie!” in a moment of outrage.  But such actions, 
though spontaneous, bear the key marks of being intentional.  The speaker gives 
application to the question that asks for his reasons: “why did you say that?”.  If 
interrupted mid-sentence, he does not need to guess (as an onlooker might) how 
the sentence would have finished.  For an action to be intentional, it does not 
need to be the product of prior planning.  
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It must because to be intentionally asserting, one must be acting under the 
description ‘asserting’.  And one cannot act under the description ‘asserting’ 
unless one possesses the concept of assertion.   The concept of assertion, in turn, 
is parasitic on the concept of belief.  To assert is, in non-defective cases, to say 
what one believes.  Furthermore, the conceptual connection between assertion 
and belief must itself be known by the asserter.11  It’s not just that in asserting, 
one is doing something that turns out (upon philosophical investigation) to be 
saying what one believes, in the way that in giving someone a gold ring, one is 
doing something that turns out (upon scientific investigation) to be giving 
someone a ring made of an element with atomic number 79.   Someone cannot 
know what she is doing in asserting yet fail to know that she is thereby purporting 
to say what she believes.  This is in part why it would be absurd to assert that p 
and at the same time deny that one believes that p, i.e., why Moore-Paradoxical 
statements are absurd, as opposed to simply revealing a surprising ignorance of 
the connection between assertion and belief.  (It is not credible that someone 
might, upon uttering a Moorean statement, assuage audience perplexity by 
saying: “Oh, I had no idea that, in asserting that p, I was putting myself forward 
as believing that p!”)  In acting under the description ‘asserting’, one is also 
acting under the description ‘saying (or purporting to say) what one believes’.  
Thus, an asserter—and hence a believer, given the argument in favor of (A)—must 
possess the concept of belief.  
                                                
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to be clearer on this point.   
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The conjunction of (A) and (B) entails that S’s believing that p by itself 
suffices for the ability to avow it.  However, Freudians might take themselves to 
have a class of counterexample: deeply repressed beliefs.  Let’s reserve the term 
‘unconscious’ for those.  My thesis—that believing entails the ability to avow—
would seem to be refuted by unconscious beliefs.   
It is undoubtedly natural to think that the difference between an 
unconscious and a conscious mental state is that one is able to avow the latter but 
not the former.12  Still, there is an intuitive sense in which an unconscious mental 
state is avowable in a way that a subpersonal mental state is not.  Therapy can 
never bring it about that a subject avows her subpersonal states, whose contents 
the subject need not even be capable of grasping.  But even Freudians hold that 
unconscious mental states could come to be avowed—that’s the goal of therapy.  
Importantly, ‘able to avow with the help of a therapist’ does not imply ‘unable to 
avow’.  Recall the example of the neurosurgeon above: there is nothing 
inconsistent about the idea of an ability that one can only exercise with help.  
Thus, the fact that help from the therapist is needed does not show that, in the 
absence of such help, the subject is deprived of the ability.  One can thus 
understand unconscious beliefs, beliefs about which the subject is in denial and 
ordinary beliefs as lying on a continuum of avowability: able to avow with the 
help of a therapist, able to avow upon the overcoming of denial and simply able to 
avow.  All are avowable.  Thus, an unconscious belief is not a true 
counterexample.   
                                                
12 This is how Finkelstein describes the difference in his 2003, ch. 5. 
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But what of very small children, who are just learning to speak?  It might 
seem, on the one hand, that they are able to assert, and on the other, that they 
lack the conceptual wherewithal to ascribe beliefs to themselves.  I will discuss 
this objection in section II (objection 4) below. 
Summarizing the argument for (B):  To assert is to put forward a 
proposition as true.  Because this ‘putting forward’ is intentional, it is a putting 
forward as what one believes.  Hence, to assert is already to be able to avow a 
belief. 
 
(C) S is able to avow the belief that p only if S knows that she believes that p. 
 
I think that there’s something right about John Hyman’s account of 
knowledge, according to which knowledge that p is the ability to do something for 
the reason that p (Hyman 1999).  I’ll rely on a weaker claim, which I have 
defended elsewhere: knowledge that p is a necessary precondition of acting 
because p, in the rational sense of ‘because’.13  The basic idea, briefly, is that in 
order, say, to walk to the restaurant because it’s open for lunch, an agent must 
know that it’s open for lunch.  She cannot do this if it’s not open for lunch or if 
she believes on the basis of false evidence that it’s open for lunch, although she 
might do so in such cases because she believes it’s open for lunch.  To say that she 
is walking to the restaurant because it’s open for lunch is to describe the action as 
resulting in a certain way from the fact’s being in view. 
                                                
13 I defend this claim in my Marcus 2012, ch. 1. 
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 Now suppose that S holds the belief that p and so, as I have argued, is able 
to avow it.  Suppose, further, that S hears from someone she trusts that those who 
believe that p tend to have good luck with the online dating service, p-date.  There 
may be barriers of various kinds to S signing up for an account on p-date, but 
they do not include an inability to act for the reason that she believes that p.  That 
she believes that p can be one of her reasons for signing up for p-date.  There 
may, of course, be obstacles to exercising this ability, either internal or external; 
and an occasion for exercising it may fail to materialize.  But to suppose that she 
has no such ability cannot be reconciled with the stipulation that she is able to 
say, authoritatively but not on the basis of observation or evidence, that she 
believes that p.  One cannot both acknowledge the avowal as authoritative in the 
relevant sense and yet deny the ability to act in light of the avowed psychological 
fact.  Of course, if one thinks of a statement of the form “I believe that p” as a 
report based on less-than-decisive evidence, then matters are different.  But this 
is exactly not to think of the utterance as an avowal.  Speculation on the basis of 
weak behavioral evidence that one believes that p does not put one in a position 
to act in light of the fact that one believes that p.  But to treat someone as in a 
position to avow the belief is thereby to credit him with an ability to act on the 
basis of the psychological fact. 
I should emphasize that the point is not that having the ability to avow a 
belief puts one in a position to know that one believes.  Insofar as knowledge that 
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p is entailed by having an ability to act in light of the fact, the ability to avow a 
belief is nothing short of self-knowledge itself.14  
 
To summarize:  Believing entails that the subject is able to honestly assert, 
the latter entails that the subject is able to avow the asserted belief, and such an 
ability entails knowledge that one holds the belief.  Therefore, believing that p is 
inseparable from knowledge that one believes.  This thesis is stronger than the 
more familiar idea that beliefs are self-intimating, understood as the thesis that a 
second-order belief is a typical causal consequence of a metaphysically 
independent first-order belief (see Mellor 1977-8 and Armstrong 1968, ch. 6 
section 10).  If one is thinking of a state that may or may not involve awareness 
that one is in that state, one is not thinking of belief.  The metaphysical profile of 
belief has a self-conscious, epistemic dimension.15 
                                                
14 Moran goes even further, describing “the ability to avow one’s belief as the 
fundamental form of self-knowledge” (Moran 2001, 150).  See also Boyle 2009.  
15 Shoemaker argues for a conclusion in this neighborhood: “where the subject 
has the concept of belief and of herself, the first-order belief’s being available 
constitutes her having the at least tacit belief that she has the first order belief” 
(Shoemaker 1996, 92-93).  And Kriegel makes a similar claim about conscious 
beliefs: “conscious beliefs always include an awareness of themselves” (Kriegel 
2004, 108).  See also Hintikka 1962.  It is more common to argue that having a 
second-order belief constitutes the possession of a first-order belief, see, e.g., 
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But the picture of doxastic knowledge that emerges from this argument is 
remarkable not just in virtue of the necessity of such knowledge, but also on 
account of its special character.  Knowing what one is doing when one asserts, I 
argued above, requires a non-evidential yet authoritative grasp of one’s holding 
the underlying belief. Since there is no question of how (i.e., by what evidence) 
someone who avows a belief knows she holds it, knowledge that one believes 
cannot be downgraded to mere belief that one believes because of bad evidence.  
This helps to explain why a successful challenge to a would-be avowal of a belief 
registers as the revelation of dishonesty rather than error.  
Some have argued that the inapplicability of epistemic challenge shows 
that expressive self-ascriptions do not manifest self-knowledge at all.16 If the 
foregoing arguments are correct, however, it shows only that there are classes of 
pronouncements that we treat as knowledge-manifesting despite there being no 
question of their epistemic grounding.  
But, it will be objected, if knowing that you believe that p involves 
believing that you believe it, my central thesis seems to imply that any belief 
brings with it an infinity of ever higher-order beliefs.  Part of the idea, however, of 
the inseparability that I’m proposing here is that the capacity for belief and the 
                                                                                                                                            
Heal 1994, 22: “when I come to think that I believe that p then I do, in virtue of 
that very thought, believe that p.”  See also Kobes 1995. 
16 See Bar-On 2004.  Finkelstein warns against assimilating what an avower 
manifests to ordinary self-knowledge, but is more circumspect on the question of 
whether it is really knowledge.  See Finkelstein 2003, 6.4. 
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capacity for awareness of what one believes are not distinct.  The relevant 
capacity is self-conscious, in the sense that its exercise is a state such that part of 
what it is to be in the state is to be able to say, not on the basis of observation or 
evidence but simply in virtue of one’s being in it, that one is in it.  As McDowell 
says of rational perceptual capacities, we should say that the power to believe “is 
a single capacity, self-consciously possessed and exercised” (McDowell 2011, 41).  
This suits the idea that knowing what I believe is not a matter of having checked 
up on my psychological state.  Such checking-up would engage a distinct 
capacity—the capacity for telling whether one holds a certain belief or not.  
Ordinary awareness that one believes that p and one’s believing that p itself are a 
single manifestation of the underlying capacity.   
How does this disrupt the burgeoning of ever higher-order beliefs?  
Consider the third-order belief.  Suppose someone were to ask whether I believe 
that I know that I believe that p.  What is in question here is not a sort of belief to 
which my account commits me one way or the other.  For it is impossible not to 
hear this as the question of whether I am in a state about which it would make 
sense to ask for my evidence—evidence for believing that I know that I believe.  
And of course, my thesis does not entail the generation of third-order beliefs of 
this evidential kind.  But it’s not clear what else there is to make of the idea of a 
belief that I have the relevant sort of doxastic knowledge.  There is simply no 
difference between knowing (in the relevant sense) that I believe that p and 
knowing (in the relevant sense) that I know (in the relevant sense) that I believe 
that p; we have added words without adding meaning (cf. Rödl 2007, 145).  All 
there is is self-conscious belief.   
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A final puzzle about self-deception: it can seem as if William is in a 
position to learn of his belief from evidence.  How is this possible if he already 
knows what he believes?  How could people ever need evidence to accept what 
they already know without evidence?  And yet it seems that they do.  William’s 
mother might ask him, in a quiet moment, to consider the significance of his 
explosive reaction to the suggestion that the artworld is still really only interested 
in Alfred, to consider whether this reaction is characteristic of someone who 
holds the challenged belief or rather of someone who knows the suggestion to be 
correct.  William might feel compelled to acknowledge that he does, after all, 
agree with his skeptical friends.  But then, prior to his mother’s intervention, it 
seems that he must not have known what he believed.  Self-deception thus seems 
to drive a wedge between belief and knowledge of belief. 
One way out of this difficulty would be simply to deny that the self-
deceived believe the propositions that they would prefer to be false.  To explain 
self-deception would then be in part to explain how it is that such a preference 
can lead to the belief that the relevant proposition is false—and to explain it 
without imputing to the subject the opposite belief (see, e.g., Mele 1987 ch. 9).  
This would be to think of William not as believing (let alone knowing) that the 
artworld remained as uninterested as ever in his work, but instead, perhaps 
through selective attention and/or motivated reasoning, as arriving at the 
opposite conclusion.  There would then be no belief for William to find out he 
possessed via evidence, and hence no wedge between belief and knowledge of 
belief. 
 28 
However, this strikes me as the wrong way to describe the example 
(although it is surely the right way to describe others), and so I do not want to 
rest my argument upon it.  Were William to assert that the artworld had finally 
come to appreciate the value of his work, I would think him dishonest.  The 
question, then, is whether there remains a credible path forward for the view that 
to believe is to know that you believe.   
If one thinks (as I do) that William holds the belief he prefers to be false, 
then to explain his self-deception is in part to explain how it is that he manages to 
shield himself from that belief while retaining it.  If such shielding amounts to 
causing himself to be ignorant of the fact that he holds the belief, then this would 
indeed introduce the separation of what I claim is inseparable.  But there is 
another interpretation.  The alternative is that William shields himself not just 
from the belief he prefers to be false, but also from his own knowledge that he 
holds the belief.  In that case, the shielding could be understood in terms of his 
directing the stream of his consciousness away from both the belief and the 
inseparable knowledge of that belief.  Belief is banished from the stream of 
consciousness, and so is doxastic self-knowledge.  Thus, belief and knowledge of 
belief are not separated after all.17    
                                                
17 It might be worried that the subject would then fail to know that she knows that 
she holds the belief, and so doxastic self-knowledge itself would fail to be self-
conscious.  However, first, the point of the alternative interpretation is precisely 
to explain the relevant ‘shielding oneself from’ in non-epistemic terms.  Just as 
this form of self-deception does not lead to ignorance of the belief, it does not 
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How should we decide which of these two interpretations is correct?  I 
submit that it is perfectly appropriate at this juncture to bring to bear a theory of 
belief.  It is, after all, a very difficult sort of case, one which we naturally find 
ourselves struggling to describe in a stable way.  There is no clear commonsense 
verdict to which one might appeal in order to settle the matter.  I have given an 
argument for a thesis that entails the second reading, and will give, in the next 
section, a theory of belief that helps to make sense of this thesis.  If the first 
reading were the only one, William’s case would be a clear counterexample.  But 
the second reading is also plausible.  
I think this modest dialectical point is sufficient for my purposes here.  But 
there are also compelling independent grounds for preferring the second reading.  
Consider that the psychological machinery of self-deception is engaged not 
simply by the offending belief, but by the subject’s awareness that she holds the 
belief.  After all, a burglar of whom one isn’t aware isn’t any more disturbing than 
the absence of burglars.  Similarly, a belief of which one is not aware shouldn’t be 
any more disturbing than a belief that one doesn’t hold.  But the self-deceived 
person is disturbed by the offending belief.  He remains conflicted, even after the 
deception has been accomplished.  He is touchy on the topic of the belief, and apt 
                                                                                                                                            
lead to ignorance of knowledge of belief.  Second, as I argued above, there is in 
fact no distinction between knowing (in the relevant sense) that I believe that p 
and knowing (in the relevant sense) that I know (in the relevant sense) that I 
believe that p.  All there is is self-conscious belief.  So there is no separate third-
order knowledge of which self-deception could deprive us.   
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to fly into a rage when pressed.  This sort of reaction is evidence that he holds the 
belief; but it is equally evidence that he knows that he holds it.  I submit that 
while this is too quick to be decisive, it does suggest a plausible direction for an 
independent argument to take.  
Up until now, I have argued that knowing you believe p is part of believing 
that p.   In section II, I will defend a theory of belief that explains this fact. 
 
II.  The Source of Doxastic Self-Knowledge 
 
 What is it about belief that makes it self-conscious?  To believe is to think 
of a proposition as having a certain feature.  What feature?  An obvious answer is 
truth.  This answer will converge, I think, on the superficially different one I give 
here.  But I will not explore that convergence in this essay.  I start from the idea 
that to believe a proposition is to see it as having some feature in virtue of which 
it is correct to believe it.  Certainly, truth is a feature of a proposition in virtue of 
which it is correct to believe it.  Let's call this feature—which may or may not be 
the same as truth—to-be-believed-ness.  To believe a proposition is for the 
believer to view it as to be believed, to view it as what one ought to believe (cf. 
Marcus 2012, ch. 1, Boyle 2011, 5.3 and Raz 2012, ch. 5).  
 I don’t mean that belief is a state of thinking that one ought to be in that 
very state.  Rather the idea is that, in believing that p, one views p as meeting a 
standard that requires cognitive conformity.  Belief is the conforming of one’s 
mind in recognition of this doxastic obligation.  Recognizing p as having this 
feature is not, according to the view I develop here, an additional belief—the 
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belief that one ought to believe that p—but rather simply an attitude towards the 
relevant proposition.  (So this is not the regress-inducing proposal that believing 
p is believing q, where q is the proposition that one ought to believe that p.)  One 
might analogously identify doubting that p as having a distinctive attitude 
towards p, as opposed to identifying it with a belief about p, viz., that it is 
doubtful.  In thinking of p as requiring belief, one is recognizing the possibility 
that such a requirement could fail to be met.  But to recognize the requirement is 
to believe the proposition.  In this section, I will elaborate on and defend the idea 
that what makes an attitude towards a proposition belief is that one views it as 
what ought to be believed. 
 Viewing a proposition as having a feature in virtue of which one ought to 
believe it might sound like having reasons for believing the proposition.  And so 
it might seem as if I advocate that beliefs are, as such, held on the basis of 
reasons.  But I am not.  ‘To-be-believed-ness’ is what good reasons show a 
proposition to possess.  To regard a proposition as to be believed is thus 
something that can be done on the basis of reasons.  Further, when we consider a 
proposition to be sufficiently well-supported by reasons, we should regard it as to 
be believed.  But regarding a proposition as meriting belief in this sense is 
logically independent of actually believing it on the basis of reasons.  One might 
so regard it without recognizing any such reasons or recognize such reasons and 
fail to so regard it.  One might even view a proposition as to be believed for which 
one knows one lacks sufficient evidence, against which one has very good 
evidence and about which one entertains serious doubts.  One thus regards a 
proposition as meriting belief despite recognizing considerations that appear to 
 32 
show that it doesn’t merit belief.  These kinds of cases involve irrationality, and so 
are neither typical nor ideal, but they are nonetheless possible—on my view as 
much as on our pre-theoretical view.   
 We shall see below that there is much to be said in favor of this view.  For 
the moment, consider the following two prima facie reasons for thinking that 
belief has an ought-ish character of some sort.   
First, when asked to explain why I do believe p—at least when this 
question is understood as asking for my reason—I comply by saying why one 
ought to believe p.  Why do I think the butler did it?  Because everyone else has 
an alibi.  In so answering, I cast my own belief as the upshot of my recognition of 
the evidence in favor of thinking of p as what to believe.  A neat explanation of 
this fact is that belief is itself just a stance on the question of whether p is to be 
believed.   
Second, note what we actually say in agreement or disagreement with an 
avowal of belief.  If I say “I believe that p,” you object not by saying “you don’t 
believe it” or by providing evidence that I don’t believe it, but rather by saying 
something to the effect of “you shouldn’t believe it” or by providing evidence that 
p isn’t true.  A straightforward explanation of this fact is that we take believing 
that p to be a stance on the question of whether p is to be believed.  
 One might object to the first datum just adduced as follows:  Since we 
sometimes believe for no reason at all and so cannot say why we believe, there is 
no reason to think that belief in general has an ought-ish character.  But that is 
wrong:  Even when our reply to the question “why do you believe p?” is “no 
reason” or “I don’t know”, we recognize that these are weak answers to the 
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question, that these replies put us in the position of maximum vulnerability to 
contrary evidence.  And were anything of importance to hang on the question of 
p, our failing to have or to know our reasons would be grounds for criticism.  
I contend my thesis about the nature of belief helps to explain how it could 
be that to believe is to know that you believe.  According to this thesis, there is 
nothing more to believing p than viewing p as to be believed.  Thus the ability just 
to say that one does believe p is nothing beyond the ability to express one’s view 
of what one ought to believe. My explanatory strategy here depends on a certain 
conception of where the central puzzle about knowledge of one’s own beliefs lies.  
I take it that it is connected to the absurdity of Moore’s Paradox.  It seems 
mysterious why making a statement about, say, the subway, e.g., “The subway is 
safe”, renders it absurd for me to deny something about myself, e.g., by saying “I 
don’t believe that the subway is safe”.  This mystery would be explained if we had 
some account of why simply having a belief about the subway puts me in a 
position to state authoritatively some fact about myself.  Such an account would 
show why the first conjunct of Moore’s Paradox seems to reveal the speaker’s 
knowledge of something that is then denied by the second conjunct.  If that’s 
right, the fundamental issue is what explains (B) above.  According to (B), one 
cannot be in a position to assert that p without being in a position to avow the 
belief that p.  While there are interesting questions about why it is that believing 
p puts one in a position to assert it and why authoritatively avowing the belief 
that p entails knowledge of one’s belief—(A) and (C) above—these are not 
confounding in the way (B) is.    
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But, according to my proposal, in saying that I do believe p, I am saying 
nothing more than that I ought to believe p.  There is no mystery of self-
knowledge in my ability to say that p, given that I believe that p.  Similarly, there 
is no mystery of self-knowledge in my ability to say that p is what I ought to 
believe, given that I think I ought to believe it.  So, if believing p is no more than 
thinking I ought to believe it, then there should be no mystery about how I am in 
a position to avow my belief.18 
This way of putting the explanation, however, courts the 
misunderstanding I warned against above, viz., that “I ought to believe p” is the 
content of a belief, distinct from the content that p.  The idea is rather that my 
recognition of p as what I ought to believe is what makes my attitude towards p 
belief. The attitude towards p that is constitutive of belief, on my proposal, is the 
recognition of p as what ought to be believed, and so what I in particular should 
believe.  To believe a proposition is to recognize that I myself am bound to believe 
it.  But there should be no more mystery about my knowing that I view p as what 
I ought to believe than there is mystery about my knowing that it is doubt or 
incredulity with which I view the proposition p, where I doubt or am incredulous 
that p.  Similarly, just as my knowledge that it is doubt with which I view a 
                                                
18Although I think that a similar account explains how we know, not on the basis 
of evidence, what we desire and what we are doing (see Marcus 2012, ch. 2), no 
such account will work for non-evidential knowledge of our own sensations.  This 
is as it should be.  Our knowledge of our active, rational attitudes is of a different 
sort than our knowledge of our passive, non-rational attitudes.  See Boyle 2009. 
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certain proposition does not depend upon evidence, my knowledge that I view p 
as to be believed also does not depend upon evidence.  My proposal thus reveals 
what belief is such that, as shown in section I, part of what it is to believe is to 
know non-evidentially that one believes.    
 I’ve been describing belief as an attitude that a person has towards a 
proposition.  Some analyze attitudes dispositionally.  I would reject any such 
analysis.  A crucial defect of dispositional accounts of belief is that they distort the 
explanatory connection between believing and the behavior to which believing 
characteristically gives rise.  If, for example, a disposition to assert that p is 
identified as partly constitutive of believing that p, then the explanatory 
connection between someone’s believing that p and their asserting that p is 
minimal, comparable to the explanatory connection between a glass’s being 
fragile and its breaking after being dropped.  In reply to the question of what it is 
about a glass’s being fragile that explains its breaking after being dropped, one 
could do no better than say that to be fragile just is to break in such 
circumstances.  Similarly, in reply to the question of what it is about S’s believing 
that p that explains S’s asserting that p, one could do no better than say that to 
believe that p just is to assert that p under the right conditions.  But there ought 
to be something more to say here.  For, intuitively, S is disposed to behave belief-
that-P-ishly (and so to assert that p) because S believes that p.  Belief, in other 
words, is not identical to but rather explains the relevant dispositions.  A theory 
of belief ought to shed some light on what belief is such that it gives rise the 
various behaviors, thoughts, and feelings that a dispositional theorist correctly 
views as characteristic of believers. And this is precisely what my theory aims to 
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do.  Belief, on my view, is not itself a disposition but is rather the standing 
attitude towards a proposition that is the source or categorical basis of the 
relevant dispositions.      
 
Objections: 
 
(1) Insofar as we think of to-be-believed-ness simply as the property of 
meeting a standard for belief, one might object that no matter what the standard 
is, believing couldn’t simply be the same as thinking of a proposition as to be 
believed.  After all, one might recognize that a proposition met a standard—any 
standard—but still fail to believe it.  This would be something like a doxastic 
version of weakness of the will.19     
 For example, there might be a certain proposition that one simply couldn't 
take seriously—say, that one’s spouse is an undercover Russian spy.  The CIA has, 
suppose, requested a meeting on the subject and, for prudential reasons, one has 
decided to take it.  The evidence is overwhelming.  At the end of the session, one 
still does not believe that she is a spy, but one is in a state expressible by saying 
such things as “I ought to believe that my wife is a spy, but I still can’t quite bring 
myself to believe it.” Such a case appears to show that viewing a proposition as 
                                                
19 Some deny the possibility of epistemic akrasia.  See, e.g., Pettit and Smith 1996.  
If they are right, of course, then the objection doesn’t get off the ground.   
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meeting the standard of correctness associated with belief is one thing, actually 
believing it is another. 
 I begin my reply by considering an example of deliberation.  Suppose a 
woman is playing poker, trying to figure out whether her opponent is bluffing.  
She considers his behavior on prior rounds of betting, which she finds 
inconclusive.  Hoping to get a read on him, she asks him whether he’ll show her 
his hand if she folds.  He enthusiastically says he will, thereby revealing that he 
wants her to fold, a sign that his hand is weak.  This evidence settles the matter 
for her—he’s bluffing.  Armed by the Russian spy example with the distinction 
between believing and the judgment that one ought to believe, we can, it seems, 
break down the transition between deliberation and belief into two steps.  There 
is, first, a step in which she accepts that certain facts bear decisively on the 
question at hand, the recognition of a binding doxastic obligation: she ought to 
believe he’s bluffing.  Second, there is a step in which she actually comes to 
believe that he’s bluffing.   
 On the face of it, however, this two-step picture is totally artificial.  If we 
really took this to be the relation between deliberation and belief, it would seem 
that a rational explanation of why a person believes p explains directly only why 
she judges that she ought to believe p.  An explanation of why she actually 
believes it would also have to mention that the ought-judgment led to the belief.  
You ask why she believes he’s bluffing and she says “because he said he’d show 
me his hand”.  You reply “that’s why you think you ought to believe he’s bluffing, 
but why do you actually believe it?”.  She would be utterly confused.  Her original 
answer seems to leave nothing of this sort to explain.  On the two-step view, there 
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would be questions about how precisely the ought-judgment gives rise to the 
belief, whether it is an automatic process or whether more activity from the 
thinker is required.  If it is automatic, one might ask how long it takes and 
whether the process can be sped up or slowed down, whether it might still be 
accomplished while the subject was asleep or drunk.  But these are very strange 
questions.  If more activity from the thinker is required, then we must ask what 
sort of activity this might be—if not more deliberation, then what?  Nothing 
comes to mind.  I shall return to this problem with the two-step view in 
discussing the next objection.   
 The two-step picture fits the case of the Russian spy.  In this case, the 
husband judges that he ought to believe that his wife is a spy, but can’t quite 
bring himself to do so.  If he does later come around to believing it, it may not be 
in virtue of having acquired any new evidence, but rather only in virtue of taking 
more seriously the evidence that he already has.  In this case, the ought-judgment 
and the belief are separate matters.  The question is whether this shows that there 
must be some such separation even when there is no other reason for thinking so.  
I submit that it shows no such thing. 
 Following what seems like the right thing to say about our two examples, 
we can make a distinction between two sorts of deliberation: engaged and 
disengaged.  On the one hand, we can take up the question of whether p is true in 
a spirit of doxastic openness; one can give oneself over to the results of one’s 
deliberation come what may.  When one deliberates in this engaged manner, 
one’s beliefs are on the line.  This is the typical case.  If I am considering whether 
p then, upon encountering what I take to be decisive evidence—q—in favor of p, I 
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thereby believe p.  There is no extra step necessary, in which I decide whether to 
adopt the belief supported by the evidence.  Nor is there some kind of waiting 
period, only after which the belief takes root. 
On the other hand, one can take up these sorts of questions in a more 
academic spirit, in a disengaged manner.  One might be unable seriously to 
entertain the idea that one’s spouse is a Russian spy, and yet one might 
nonetheless examine the evidence.  Whether or not one will go along with the 
results of this inquiry may then not be settled simply by the power of the 
evidence; one’s affection or loyalty may block what one acknowledges are decisive 
epistemic reasons for belief.  This example opens up space in the mind of the 
deliberator between ‘I ought to believe’ and ‘I do believe’ just because he is not 
engaged in deliberation in the normal way.  
Viewing a proposition as ‘to be believed’ is the characteristic product of 
theoretical deliberation.  More specifically, it is the characteristic product of 
engaged as opposed to disengaged deliberation.  We might equally well use the 
same words to express the conclusion of either sort of deliberation:  “I should 
believe p”.  In one case we are looking at the evidence in order to make up our 
mind what to believe; in the other case we aren’t.  But only in the former case 
does the statement express the thinker’s representing p as to be believed, in my 
sense.  In the CIA case, the husband is not examining the evidence with the 
ordinary sort of attitude; his wife’s being a Russian spy is not something he is 
willing to contemplate seriously.  Hence, he ends up with the sort of opinion that 
results from disengaged deliberation, in which a gap opens up between the result 
of the deliberation and what one in fact believes.    
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My point is neither that beliefs are always the product of deliberation, nor 
that engaged deliberation always results in belief, nor that disengaged 
deliberation never results in belief.  My claim is rather that belief is the 
characteristic product of engaged deliberation.  There is, on the one hand, 
thinking that one ought to believe p, where the thinking is of the sort 
characteristically arrived at on the basis of engaged deliberation; and, on the 
other hand, there is thinking one ought to believe p, where the thinking is of the 
sort characteristically arrived on the basis of disengaged deliberation.  I am thus 
using the distinction between the two sorts of deliberation to direct the reader’s 
attention to a distinction between two sorts of normative attitudes that one might 
take towards a pair of propositions.  But neither attitude entails the occurrence of 
any deliberation. 
 
(2) Believing, then, is a matter of viewing a proposition as possessing a certain 
normative property, which can be understood as the characteristic product of 
engaged deliberation—to-be-believed-ness.  As I said above, the normative 
element is not to be understood as a component of the content, but rather as part 
of the attitude towards p that constitutes belief.  So, if propositional attitudes in 
general can be characterized as ways of viewing a proposition, belief in particular 
can be further specified as viewing a proposition as what ought to be believed.  
But one might wonder what this amounts to.  In what sense can an attitude 
towards p be a ‘viewing-as-what-ought-to-be-believed’, if not by somehow 
involving a distinct belief, explicit or implicit, with the content ‘p ought to be 
believed’?  
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 I begin my answer to this question where my reply to the previous 
objection left off: there is no difference between considering whether to believe p 
and considering (in an engaged manner) whether p is to be believed.  There are 
not two separate questions, (i) whether to believe the content ‘p’ and (ii) whether 
to believe the content ‘p ought to be believed’.  This is what the artificiality of the 
two-step picture establishes: we do not treat the former question as bearing on a 
content distinct from the latter question.  The question of whether to believe p is, 
necessarily, already the question of whether one ought to believe p (in the sense 
that corresponds to engaged deliberation).  The latter merely makes explicit the 
normative character of the belief-attitude.  One does not alter the content under 
consideration by adding to it ‘ought to be believed’.  (One might make a similar 
claim about ‘is true’.)   
 If you think of ‘viewing-as-to-be-believed’ not as the attitude constitutive 
of belief, but instead merely as part of the content of a distinct belief, then we are 
left with a question about how the gap between this normative belief about p and 
the belief that p itself is traversed.  It’s clear why one’s rational activity, in the 
form of weighing the evidence in favor of p, can move one to believe that one 
ought to believe p, since the evidence shows precisely what one ought to believe.  
But how does one go from believing that p is to be believed to believing p itself, 
supposing that these are distinct?  Not on the basis of more evidence.  After all, 
the evidence in favor of believing p is precisely the evidence that one ought to 
believe p.  So the transition from the latter to the former (if there must be such a 
transition) cannot be understood as the direct expression of the subject’s rational 
activity.  It would have to be a process of ‘sinking in’ that one hopes takes place 
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subsequent to one’s recognition that p deserves to be believed. One could label 
this process ‘rational’ or not, but it would amount to viewing the making up of 
one’s mind as outsourced, at the final stage, to unconscious or subpersonal 
mechanisms that one could at best cheer on as they did or didn’t churn out the 
belief at which one hoped to arrive.  Better to reject the gap between viewing p as 
to be believed and believing p. 
 The difficulty for the ‘gap’ view, I should emphasize, has nothing to do 
with the immediacy of the alleged transition between believing that p ought to be 
believed and simply believing that p.  And so it is no use responding that in some 
cases the latter might be the immediate effect of the former.  The point is that, no 
matter how immediate the transition, belief that p, on the ‘gap’ view, is 
something external to the agent’s doxastic reasoning about p, for such reasoning 
cannot take you beyond believing that p ought to be believed.  
 Against the objection, then, that viewing p as-to-be-believed must in the 
end be understood as a belief with a content distinct from p, I have argued that in 
fact it is simply the belief that p itself.   
 
(3)  It might be objected that my proposal at best shows that believing 
something entails knowing that one ought to believe it.  How can the gap be 
bridged between this and knowledge of what one actually does believe?  Mustn’t 
it be bridged in part by the subject’s knowledge that believing something is 
recognizing that one ought to believe it?  But since this is just a theory, a theory 
that is not widely held, it is hardly plausible that everyone relies on it whenever 
they believe anything.           
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 If the theory is correct, however, then we do all already believe it.  One 
point of the first section is that we already think of non-evidentially knowing 
what one believes as built-in to believing.  Upon hearing someone say “I believe 
that p,” we do not ask “how do you know that’s what you think?”.  And no one 
(outside philosophy) would know what to make of the question if we did ask it.  I 
have also attempted to make salient to the reader that we answer the question 
“why do you believe that p?’ in a manner that suggests that we take our believing 
that p to be dependent on what we think we ought to believe.  My thesis, then, is 
that we already operate with an understanding of what it is to hold a belief 
according to which it is the attitude of taking a proposition to be worthy of belief, 
and that this explains both why and how we know what we believe.  This paper 
thus aims to bring what we all already know to philosophical self-consciousness.   
But it might be argued that even if believers implicitly operate with an 
understanding of this theory, there is still a gap between thinking of a proposition 
as to be believed and knowing that one thinks of it that way.  How does someone 
who represents p as to be believed know that she is in fact responsive to the 
relevant doxastic obligation?  How can believing that p enable me to rule out my 
being incorrect about how I view p?  My reply is that it may not, but that this 
doesn't matter.  For my statement “I believe that p” to be authoritative is for it 
genuinely to be the expression of my regarding p as to be believed, i.e., my stance 
on the question of p.  If I don't believe it, then, of course, I can neither honestly 
assert that p nor authoritatively express my belief by saying I believe it.  And I 
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might not be able to tell the difference between these cases; my capacity to know 
what I believe is thus fallible.20  
 The point will be pressed: how could my being in a position to say that p is 
to be believed put me in the position to say that I represent p as to be believed?  
To say the former is to say something about p; to say the latter is to say 
something about myself, which someone else might put by saying “you believe 
that p”.  However, I am not saying, in avowing, that I believe that p in the same 
sense as I am saying, in asserting, that p.  Your “you believe that p” is, like my 
“p”, an assertion.  My “I believe that p” is not an assertion that I believe that 
p.  Hence “but it's false that you believe that p”, said in reply to an avowal in an 
ordinary context, is befuddling and registers as a change of key.  My view is an 
attempt to unpack that metaphor.  An avowal “I believe that p” does not express 
my representing the proposition that I believe that p as to be believed, rather it 
expresses my representing the proposition that p as to be believed.  It is the 
verbalized form of the underlying theoretical act, in which I represent the 
proposition as binding me.  Your “but it's false that you believe that p” treats what 
I said as if it were an expression of a stance on the truth of “I believe that p”, 
opposing it with the contrary view.  But the proper “key” of criticism is really not 
that I've made a false assertion, but that I've spoken dishonestly, since I am not in 
the avowed state.  An authentic avowal is one that expresses the avowed state, 
and it is authentic avowal that exhibits ‘first-person authority’. 
                                                
20 Compare McDowell on our self-conscious perceptual capacities in McDowell 
2011, 36-44. 
 45 
 
 (4) According to a fourth objection, my view is refuted by the fact that it 
cannot be extended to non-rational animals.  Many would insist that such 
animals do believe, despite their lacking the conceptual wherewithal even to 
grasp propositions, let alone to view them as to be believed.   This objection can 
take several forms; it is worth disentangling them in order to isolate what I take 
to be the deepest version. 
The first version is methodological.  By declaring my topic at the start to be 
our beliefs, I might be accused of banishing non-rational animals from the realm 
of believers by a kind of methodological fiat.  But this is wrong.  It is not because 
of how I’ve elected to use the word ‘belief’ in this essay that cats, mice and owls 
cannot give application to the question “why do you believe that p?”.  And it is on 
the basis of this sort of fact that I conclude that we do not ascribe to non-rational 
creatures what we ascribe to rational ones using the term ‘belief’.  Thus, I have 
not simply defined animal belief out of existence. 
The second version is semantic.  Someone might say that, according to my 
view, anyone who uses the term ‘belief’ to describe a non-human animal is 
speaking falsely.  Hence animal psychologists and zoologists who explain animal 
behavior in terms of belief are mistaken.  And we should be very reluctant to 
attribute this sort of widespread error to the experts.  However, my thesis is not 
about the term ‘belief’, but about what that term normally designates when it is 
applied to adult humans.  The latter states are such that you cannot be in one 
without knowing it, and this fact is explained by aspects of their nature that also 
explain why non-rational creatures can’t be in them at all.  It is perfectly 
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consistent with this thesis that the term ‘belief’ can be correctly used to refer to 
the states of non-rational creatures.  
 This brings us to the most worrisome version of the objection.  It can seem 
as if my claim that non-rational animals lack beliefs ultimately commits me to the 
idea that animals are no more capable of thought than rocks and plants.  But 
plainly, animals learn about their environment on the basis of perception, and act 
on the basis of knowledge so acquired.  Furthermore, they display, to varying 
degrees, intelligence and ingenuity in deploying their perceptual knowledge.  We 
thus see in animals the same nexus of perception, thought and action that we find 
in humans, a nexus that is, as I have put it elsewhere, “subserved by significant 
anatomical and genetic overlap and ultimately explained by a shared evolutionary 
history.”21  And it can seem as if the only way of accommodating these facts is by 
holding that the nature of rational and non-rational thought is precisely the 
same.    
  Yet we have seen that there are excellent reasons for thinking that we do 
not ascribe to non-humans what we ascribe to humans when we use the term 
‘belief’.  It is part of the truth-conditions of “S believes that p”, where S is a 
person, that S has the conceptual wherewithal to understand p.  Even beliefs 
about which someone is in denial or beliefs that are repressed in the Freudian 
sense are such that the believer is capable of grasping the relevant propositions.  
Belief is thus linked to understanding.  It could not be otherwise given that 
                                                
21 Marcus 2012, 117.  I defend at length in ch. 3 the view that non-rational animals 
are not believers. 
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believing that p puts one on the hook for answering the question “what are your 
reasons for believing p?”.  The requirement that beliefs be eligible to be held on 
grounds thus goes hand-in-hand with the requirement that the objects of belief 
be understood by the believer.  And it is surely no coincidence that animal 
thought does not meet either of these requirements and that animals do not 
possess distinctive first-personal knowledge of their own thoughts.  Given these 
interconnected dissimilarities, it would seem that an account of non-rational 
thought should differ sharply from an account of rational thought.  And with our 
account in hand, many otherwise mysterious aspects of belief have become 
explicable: (1) why a fully adequate answer to the question of why I believe p can 
be a statement of why one ought to believe p, (2) why, in order to believe p, I 
must have the ability to grasp the proposition that p, (3) why merely holding a 
belief explains my ability to avow it, and consequently (4) why I cannot 
intelligibly assert that p and at the same time disavow the belief that p. 
 The key question is whether one can affirm an account of the sort I 
advocate without denying the obvious continuities between the minds of non-
rational and rational animals.  I contend that one can, although there is space 
here only to sketch the way forward in broad strokes.  The core idea is that 
human thought and non-human thought should be understood as distinct species 
of a single genus.  That both are species of a single genus—and so we are not 
simply equivocating in speaking of thought in both cases—is a function of the 
common role thought plays at the nexus of perception and action in the lives of 
both kinds of creatures.  That there are distinct species of thought is a function of 
the fact that (as we have seen) what one is saying about an adult to whom one 
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ascribes thought is different from what one is saying of a non-rational animal to 
whom one ascribes thought.  On this conception, the acquisition by a species (or 
an individual) of rationality does not merely add to existing perceptual, cognitive 
and practical capacities, leaving them as they were (though supplemented by 
additional capacities).  Rather, rationality transforms the original capacities 
themselves.  Thought of any form puts thinkers in cognitive contact with the 
world, but the form that this contact takes is different in the case of rational and 
non-rational creatures.22  The task for a defender of this transformative 
conception of rationality, as Matthew Boyle has called it, is to say, in a detailed 
and plausible way, what it means to speak in this way of distinct forms of 
thought, as opposed to simply of distinct thought-contents.23  
                                                
22 A full, historical account of human beings would, of course, explain how 
rational animals evolved from non-rational animals.  Such an account is well 
beyond the scope of this essay.  However it is worth emphasizing that my view 
does not pose any sort of threat to the possibility of such an account.  It does 
follow from my view that human beings are, in respect of the qualities that 
constitute their rational nature, qualitatively dissimilar from our ancestors as 
well as from living species on our phylogenetic tree.  But there is nothing odd 
from the point of view of evolutionary theory about the emergence of qualitative 
differences. 
23 This understanding of rationality is defended in McDowell 1994.  Boyle has 
gone farther than anyone else in carrying out the project.  See Boyle 
(forthcoming).   
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 Much of what I’ve just said about animal minds can be said about the 
minds of very young humans.  But special difficulties for my argument might be 
thought to arise about those who are becoming rational.  One might suppose that, 
at a certain stage of development, children possess concepts, but not the concepts 
that make self-reflection possible, and hence that they assert before being able to 
self-ascribe.  However, this is neither intuitively obvious nor empirically sound.   
It should be noted, first, that children start to use mental state words (such 
as ‘think’, ‘remember’ and ‘know’) to refer to mental states at around age two and 
a half (Shatz, Wellman, and Silber 1983), and that three-year-olds are beginning 
to acquire the concept of belief—false-belief test evidence notwithstanding (Leslie 
1994).  So the question comes down to whether children between eighteen and 
thirty-six months are able to make assertions, in the sense relevant to the 
satisfaction of the condition specified in (A).  An affirmative answer is far from 
assured by the observation that children at this age are beginning to string words 
together into sentences.  For the question is whether they are doing what we are 
doing when we string words together into sentences.  We are (often) putting 
forward a sentence as true.  And because this ‘putting forward’ is intentional, it is 
(as argued above) a putting forward as what one believes.  There is no reason 
whatsoever to believe that eighteen-to-thirty-six month-old children do this.  Any 
child who possesses the conceptual sophistication necessary to do this would also 
possess the conceptual sophistication necessary to self-ascribe.  Of course this 
sophistication does not come all at once.  As a child slowly masters the network of 
interrelated concepts that provide the necessary background, her grasp of 
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assertion and avowal are equally incomplete and tentative, and so is her ability to 
assert and avow (intentionally).   
 
(5) It might be objected that my view has a very odd consequence, namely that 
in believing that p, I think that everyone ought to believe p.  A problem in this 
vicinity bedevils accounts of belief according to which one ought to believe that p 
if and only if p is true (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007).  It is worth pointing out 
that some of these problems do not carry over to my view.  Since I am not arguing 
that all true propositions are to be believed, it cannot be objected to my view that 
we might as a consequence be obliged to believe true propositions that are 
impossible to believe truly or that we might be obliged to believe propositions too 
complex for any of us to believe.  The normative character of belief, on my view, is 
a function not of a norm that links belief to truth, but rather of the fact that 
believing is itself a normative attitude towards a proposition.   A central way 
believers are governed by norms is written in to the very act of belief itself, in 
which one’s recognition of a norm constitutes responsiveness to it.   
But it is nonetheless self-evidently wrong that insofar as I believe that, say, 
I have only one garbage bag left, I represent this proposition as what everyone 
should believe.  Yet if it is not what everyone should believe, then how exactly can 
the recognition that p is to be believed be at the same time a recognition of a 
doxastic obligation that binds me, i.e., if not by universal instantiation? 
To hold that everyone should believe that I have only one garbage bag left 
would be to hold, absurdly, that a believer would be deficient in some respect for 
failing to accept this proposition.  One might attempt to lessen the absurdity by 
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comparing it to the case of someone who, in a familiar enough sense, ought not to 
ride a certain elevator because, unbeknownst to him, it is about to get stuck in 
between floors.  He might fail to do what he ought, although no one can blame 
him.  Failing to do what one ought, where one is in the dark about facts that 
would enable one to recognize the obligation, is excusable.  One’s ignorance can 
even be completely exculpatory.  Perhaps the same can be said for the doxastic 
obligations I see others as bound by when I believe a proposition to be true.   
But the following is still absurd: that in believing that I have only one 
garbage bag left, I must thereby condemn, excuse or exculpate those who do not 
share my belief.  The revised view no less than the original flies in the face of the 
fact that in thinking of p as what ought to be believed (and so what I should 
believe), I recognize an obligation that is relevant to me only insofar as I have 
taken up the question of p.  To believe that p is to think: with respect to p, one 
should assent, as opposed to deny or sit on the fence.  To think of p as ‘to be 
believed’ is, then, to think that everyone who addresses herself to the question of 
p should believe it.24  But one cannot recognize such an obligation without at the 
same time knowing that one has taken up the question of whether p.  Hence, to 
see p as to be believed is to see it as to be believed by me. 
 
(6) It might seem as if my conception of belief as a standing normative 
attitude towards a proposition is at odds with an intuitive view of the relation 
                                                
24 This proposal is similar to the one attributed to Wedgwood in Bykvist and 
Hattiangadi 2007. 
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between perception and belief.  Believing on the basis of perception is, one might 
think, simply a matter of taking at face value that things are the way one’s 
perceptual experience represents them as being.  To ‘take at face value’, according 
to this objection, means that one does not bring to bear any normative concepts, 
but rather only the concepts corresponding to the content of the relevant belief 
about the world.   
 But this paper’s arguments apply equally well to perceptual beliefs, which 
have the same ought-ish character as beliefs formed by inference or on the basis 
of testimony.  They all take the query:  “Why do you think so?”  This question 
might be (somewhat artificially) elaborated upon as follows:  “Why is it that you 
regard this proposition as meriting belief?”  And such a question is generally 
considered to have been satisfactorily answered by “I saw it with my own eyes” or 
the like.  
 How precisely to fit belief into a complete picture of human life—
exhibiting its connections to perception, non-doxastic cognitive states and 
action—will have to wait for a more sustained treatment.  But here, very briefly, is 
what I take to be the chief difficulty with conceiving of perceptually-based belief 
as non-normative.  So understood, it would be an automatic cognitive effect of 
undergoing sensory stimulation, something that one found oneself ‘thinking’, just 
as one finds oneself undergoing perceptual experiences themselves.  However 
this distorts a fundamental contrast between perception and belief, one that 
Wittgenstein gets at in saying “one can mistrust one’s own senses, but not one’s 
own belief” (Wittgenstein 1956, 190; cf. Moran 2001, 3.1).  It is because 
perceptual experiences are such that one ‘finds oneself’ undergoing them, that 
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one can trust or mistrust them: one can take them or not take them to be 
revelatory of the truth.  And it is because belief just is the person’s thinking of the 
proposition as meriting belief that talk of mistrust is out of place.  To believe that 
p is to have settled (perhaps only provisionally) the question of p for oneself.  It is 
an exercise of the subject’s theoretical agency.  But nothing that automatically 
happens to one can be one’s having settled any question for oneself (even 
provisionally).  At best it can be a datum that speaks in favor of or against a 
proposition, a datum that might be cited in justification for believing it or not 
believing it.    
 
III.   Conclusion 
 
Let me return to a remark made above concerning Moore’s Paradox.  If to 
believe is to know that one believes, then an assertion that p expresses not just 
the belief that p, but also knowledge that one believes that p.  This fact would go 
along way to explaining why we have a difficult time making any sense of 
statements of the form “p, but I don’t believe that p.”  Interestingly, everything 
I’ve said here regarding belief and knowledge of belief goes also for reasons for 
belief and our knowledge of those reasons.  The following conjunction is 
paradoxical in precisely the same way as Moore’s original:  “There are cameras 
everywhere, so the subway is safe; but I don’t believe that the subway is safe 
because I believe there are cameras everywhere.”  There is an argument that 
stands to this conjunction the way my argument in section I stands to the original 
version of the paradox.  One cannot believe that the subway is safe for this reason 
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and yet fail to be in a position to give one’s reason in the style of the first 
conjunct.  And one cannot be in a position to so give one’s reason and yet be 
unable to just say explicitly that it is one’s reason—i.e., one must be able to avow 
it.  Finally, one cannot be in a position to avow one’s reason for belief and yet fail 
to know what it is.  Why should it be that believing for a reason consists partly in 
knowing that one believes for that reason?  Because believing p for reason q just 
is taking the to-be-believed-ness of p to be a consequence of the to-be-believed-
ness of q.* 
                                                
* Versions of this paper were presented at Kansas State, Guelph, and Auburn 
University.  Thanks to those audiences for their helpful comments.  This paper 
also benefited from discussions with Jason Bridges, David Finkelstein, Anton 
Ford, Keren Gorodeisky, Matthias Haase, Kelly Jolley, Tom Lockhart, Mark 
McCullagh, John Schwenkler and Michael Watkins.  Gratitude is due especially to 
Arata Hamawaki for many extended and clarifying conversations.  I would also 
like to thank two anonymous referees and the editors of dialectica. 
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